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A neglected, if not almost ignored topic in formal semantic theories of natural
language are semantic (or meaning) relations between lexical items. Results from
psycholinguistics and neuroscience, in particular based on the N400, provide ample
evidence that such relations play indeed an important and prominent role during
the (semantic) processing of sentences in the brain. For example, although neither
John squeezed an orange nor John squeezed an apple contain a semantic anomaly,
they are processed dierently in the brain, because orange is more expected as the
direct object of squeeze than apple. Similarly, This melon sounds ripe is acceptable
whereas This melon sounds oval is not, although in both cases an adjective is used
that is semantically not directly related to the sound dimension of a melon.
In this article we propose a dynamic and probabilistic extension of frame theory
(Löbner 2014, Naumann 2013) in which data like the above can be analyzed. In
order to capture both semantic relations and constraints (or expectancies), we use
techniques from Dependence Logic (Väänänen 2007) and theories of belief revision
and belief update (Spohn 1988, Goldszmidt & Pearl 1992, Boutilier 1998, Gärdenfors
1988). Using frames makes it possible to use a decompositional analysis: an object
is related to a set of properties that can be changed by events. As a consequence,
a lexical item like ‘orange’ can be taken as a table in a database or knowledge
base consisting of attribute-value pairs. This way of interpreting lexical items
makes it possible to apply the strategies from Dependence Logic and theories of
belief revision and belief update mentioned above. In particular, it is possible (i) to
dene dependency relations between dierent properties of an object and (ii) to
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dene quantitative plausiblity relations (κ-rankings) on a frame that determine
how this frame is revised or updated with new information.
1 Introduction
According to many, if not most, current formal semantic theories, common nouns
like ‘orange’ or ‘paper’ are basically analyzed as sets of objects. For example,
‘orange’ is rst translated as the lambda-term λx.orange(x), which, in a second
step, is interpreted as a subset of the domain, or, more precisely, as a function
from this domain to the set of truth values (1a). Similarly, using an event-based
approach, verbs like ‘run’ are interpreted as sets of events or the corresponding
characteristic function (1b).
(1) a. [[orange]]M = λx ∈ D〈eobject〉forange(x) = 1
b. [[run]]M = λe ∈ D〈eevent〉frun(e) = 1
In recent years, such approaches to dening the semantics of basic lexical items like
common nouns and verbs have been criticized from neuroscience. According to
Baggio & Hagoort (2011), those theories are ‘by design insensitive to dierences
between words of the same syntactic category denoting objects of the same type’
(Baggio & Hagoort 2011, 1343). As a consequence, they are inappropriate as a
theory of semantic processing in the brain. This criticism is based on empirical
results from neurophysiological and neuroimaging phenomena like the N4001,
which is a component of event-related potentials (ERP’s), whose amplitude is
modulated by semantic complexity.
N400.
Consider the examples in (2) and (3).
(2) a. Jenny put the sweet in her mouth after the lesson.
b. Jenny put the sweet in her pocket after the lesson.
(3) Every morning John makes himself a glass of freshly squeezed juice. He keeps
his refrigerator stocked with (oranges/apples/carrots).
1 For details on this component, see Baggio & Hagoort (2011).
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A formal semantic analysis of the sentences in (2) diers only in the sort of object
assigned to the locative argument of the verb put: mouth versus pocket. Yet, when
this sentence is uttered in a context where Jenny leaves the classroom after a lesson,
Hagoort & Brown (1994) found a dierence in the N400 between mouth and pocket,
showing that there is a dierence during processing in the brain that needs to
be accounted for by formal semantic theories.
Sentences like (3) were used by Federmeier & Kutas (1999) in an ERP experiment
also targeting the N400. The authors found an increasing N400 eect with the
ordering ‘oranges’ < ‘apples’ < ‘carrots’. According to one interpretation of the
N400, this eect is closely related to predicting upcoming words in a sentence
which is based on semantic relations between words in the memory component
of the brain. For example, in (3) both ‘apple’ and ‘carrot’ trigger a larger N400
compared to ‘orange’ because the former are semantically less related to an event of
squeezing a fruit than the latter (Kutas & Federmeier 2011). As an eect, the cost of
semantically integrating ‘apple’ or ‘carrot’ in the given semantic context (say ‘John
squeezed’) is higher than in the case of ‘orange’. Thus, the N400 is an eect that is
directly related to semantic relations between concepts expressed by words in
the lexicon, in particular by relations between nominal and verbal concepts.
Stimulus subject perception verbs.
Perception-based verbs (henceforth PBVs) refer to sensory properties of objects like
‘taste’ or ’sound’. Correlated to each sense modality is a set of values that this
property can take and which are specic to it. For example, for the property ‘sight’
appropriate values are ‘square’, ‘oblong’ and ‘oval’. PBVs admit of a direct-sensory
use in which a predicative complement is added. Semantically, this complement
species an intra-dimensional value, i.e. an element of the set of values appropriate
for the property expressed by the verb.
(4) This melon sounds mued/tastes sweet/smells fruity.
In addition to the direct perception use, PBVs can be used inferentially. In this case
the predicative complement does not determine a value of the scale corresponding
to the modality expressed by the verb, but a value belonging to another modality.
(5) a. This melon sounds ripe/old/*oval.
b. This melon looks oval/*mued.
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The examples in (5) show that the inferential use is not always admissible but
depends on the types of sense modalities expressed by the verb and the predicative
complement. Thus, similar to the examples of simple sentences, semantic pro-
cessing of this use of PBVs involves semantic relations. In this case, these are
relations between dierent properties of objects that can be changed by actions or
events.
The the . . . the construction.
The third and nal construction involving semantic relations discussed in this
article is the the . . . the-construction.
(6) a. The older a stamp, the more expensive it is.
b. The more alcohol you drink, the higher is your blood alcohol concentration.
c. The more residents are aected, the sooner noise abatement measures will
be implemented.
Similar to the inferential use of PBVs, this construction expresses a dependency
relation between the values of two properties over time. The relation between
the values of the two properties need not be strict, as shown by the following
example: ‘The older a stamp, the more likely it is that it gets more expensive’.
What is common to all the examples discussed in this section are the following
points: (i) there is an explicit or implicit reference to properties of objects or events.
Events of squeezing are semantically more related to objects of sort ‘orange’ than
to, say, objects of sort ‘carrots’; this reference is explicit in the case of the inferential
use of PBVs and the the . . . the construction. It is always implicit in the case of verbs,
at least if they are formally analyzed as given in (1b). (ii) this reference to properties
of objects and events is not used in isolation but rather in the context of a semantic
relation between various properties. So what is at stake are semantic relations
and, even more importantly, the degree to which those properties are semantically
related to each other. This latter aspect will be called semantic closeness between
properties (or between the concepts related to those properties) and (iii) since
all example involve non-stative verbs like ‘squeeze’, or analogous constructions
like ‘getting older’, which denote events that bring about changes with respect
to objects, one also has to consider semantic relations between properties over
time when the values of these properties are changed by actions or events.
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2 Outline of the theory
According to Baggio and Hagoort (2011:1342), formal semantic theories which
describe how words belonging to dierent syntactic categories or denoting dierent
sorts of objects combine to more complex units are ‘by design insensitive to
dierences between words of the same syntactic category denoting objects of
the same type’. The authors put the blame for this ‘insensitivity’ on the fact that
such theories focus on truth conditions, i.e. how language relates to the world,
and not on considering natural language as a psychological phenomenon. What
is required, instead, is to provide a theory of semantic processing that is both
combinatoric and able to track usage-based semantic expectations of the kind
involved in the data from section 1. It is important to note that this criticism
not only applies to static formal semantic theories in which the notion of truth
conditions is taken as central but equally to dynamic variants of formal semantics
if the dynamic component is restricted to account for inter-sentential anaphoric
relations, which are analyzed in terms of discourse referents or pegs. Consider
(3) again. The dynamic aspect of the update operation triggered by the direct
object (say ‘an orange’) is independent of the particular sort of object, but only
depends on the context change potential of the existential quantier associated
with the translation of ‘a’ in the formal language since this constituent introduces a
new discourse referent. By contrast, the head noun receives a completely static
interpretation. It is analyzed as a test. The sortal information provided by the
common noun is used to eliminate all possibilities in which the object assigned to
the discourse referent fails to satisfy this condition. As a result, there is no further
dierence between, say, ‘an orange’ and ‘an apple’ at this level of information.
What is completely missing from this view of information encapsulated both
in static and dynamic approaches to meaning in natural language is the aspect
that (declarative) sentences describe situations in the world. Such a description
can either concern the fact that some property of an object holds (or fails to hold) or
that an event (action) occurs which changes some property of an object. One area
in which this type of information is dealt with are theories of belief revision and
belief update. Belief revision is usually taken as dealing with incorporating new
information about a static, unchanging world. By contrast, belief update is about
incorporating information about changes in the world that are triggered by actions
or events. New information about a static world is incorporated into a ranked belief
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set (often called an epistemic state). As a consequence, the way such an epistemic
state is changed not only depends on the formulas that currently form the belief set
(or knowledge base) of an agent but also on the way those formulas (or the possible
worlds used to interpreted those formulas) are ranked. Such information cannot
be inferred if the meaning is restricted to sortal information, say it is an orange or a
running, and if the dynamics only captures discourse information.
The conclusion that we draw from this failure of current formal semantic theories
is that semantic processing cannot solely be based on (i) truth-conditional content
and (ii) discourse information in form of information about anaphoric relations which
leads to the notion of a context change potential in terms of discourse referents or
pegs and (iii) (possibly) world knowledge and context information. In addition,
there are at least three further types of information: (i) information about the
semantic closeness between nominal and verbal concepts, which expresses degrees
of expectancy or plausibility between these two types of concepts. This type of
information corresponds to ranking functions in theories of belief revision and belief
update; (ii) dependency relations between the values of two properties of an object
which can be expressed in Dependence Logic and (iii) information about the way such
dependencies are related over time if the values of the corresponding properties are
changed by events. Such information requires the use of various ranking functions
that not only consider static semantic relations but also the way of how such relations
can be defined in the context in which not only a static world but a world in which
events bring about changes is taken into consideration (belief update).2
Consider the following example. When processing a common noun like ‘orange’,
a language user only gets sortal information: it is an object of sort ‘orange’ belong-
ing to a particular subset of the universe (or the domain of the model). This kind of
information is exactly what is usually captured in an (extensional, type-theoretic)
truth-conditional semantics and which is formalized by the meaning or satisfaction
clauses in (1). This aspect of meaning will be called the proper or lexical meaning of
a common noun or an intransitive verb. Thus, as in model-theoretic semantics, the
lexical meaning of common nouns and verbs is dened in terms of only sortal
information and (possibly) its arity.
2 Another way of looking at the dierence between current dynamic approaches and our approach is
the following: whereas the former denes the dynamics with respect to words belonging to closed
word classes like determiners (‘a‘ or ‘some’) or modal expressions like ‘might’ (Veltman’s Update
Semantics), our approach locates the dynamics in open word classes like common nouns and verbs
that are used to express changes occurring in the world.
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Given only this information, no information about non-sortal properties is sup-
plied. In order to get such information, a language user applies both local contextual
information and global world knowledge to extend this lexical information, e.g. by
information about properties of objects.3
sort color form origin ripeness taste
object orange green oval spain ripe sweet
Table 1: Tabular representation of the lexical meaning of the common noun ‘orange’
enriched with contextual information and world knowledge
From a linguistic point of view, the representation in Table 1 provides a decom-
positional analysis of a common noun.
(7) λx(orange(x) ∧ color(x) = green ∧ form(x) = oval ∧ origin(x) = spain ∧
ripeness(x) = ripe ∧ taste(x) = smooth . . .)
However, such a decompositional representation of the meaning of a lexical item is
still both a at and completely static structure in the following sense. First, no
distinction is made between admissible values for a particular property. Although
these values can be ordered (e.g. say in form a scale, i.e. a partially or linearly
ordered set), there is no relation that orders them with respect to plausibility or
expectancy. Second, no distinction is made between admissible values for objects to
which this object can be related. For example, for the denotation of common nouns:
what are the most plausible (expected) events that bring about a change w.r.t. one
of its properties? Conversely, for events denoted by verbs: with respect to which
sorts of objects does the event most likely bring about a change? Third, ‘Does the
event have more than one outcome, i.e. it is deterministic or non-deterministic?’
Fourth, no information about dependencies between (the values of) properties
is expressed. Thus, the problem is not only related to getting more information, but
also to the question of how this information is ranked and what dependencies exist
between dierent properties. However, in order to impose both expectancy and
3 Thus, our analysis follows Hagoort’s ‘Immediacy Hypothesis’: all sorts of information available to
the comprehender is immediately used in parallel in order to arrive at a meaningful interpretation.
According to this hypothesis, a language user not only uses the information provided by the lexical
meaning of an expression, say it is an orange or a port, but also information from the context in which
an expression is processed and his world and/or background knowledge.
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dependency constraints a decompositional analysis of the denotations of common
nouns and verbs is needed because only then is it possible to explicitly refer to
the properties with respect to which those constraints are dened.
Another way of looking at this problem is in terms of the information state of
a language user. We follow dynamic approaches and dene an information state as
a set of possibilities consisting of the alternatives that are still open according
to the information available to the language user. In this paper information sets are
dened in terms of variable assignments.4 Following standard practice, sets of
assignments will be called possible worlds. Consider (7) again. The information
state of a language user w.r.t. to this information is given by a set of possible worlds
capturing his epistemic uncertainty, which is due to the fact that his knowledge
about the values of properties of an orange is only partial and incomplete. As
an eect, his knowledge consists of all those possibilities that are compatible
with his current knowledge. In the present case the alternatives concern possible
expansions of his knowledge about the orange. He then assumes that the actual
(correct) description is some subset U of the set W of possible worlds. However,
since all possible worlds are assumed to have equal status for the language user, no
world is preferred or more expected than any other in the set of all possibilities. As
a consequence, updating amounts to intersecting. A further problem concerns
the information that a language user can infer from his current information state
provided, say, by applying the information given by the lexical meaning plus
context information together with world knowledge. If his information state is
a at structure in the sense that all worlds are taken as equal, no information about
the values of properties about which no information is provided can (defeasibly) be
drawn. By contrast, if a language user has information both about dependency
and expectancy relations, he can use this type of information to (defeasibly or
non-defeasibly) infer other pieces of information about the situation described
by the sentences he is currently processing. For example, knowing only that a
melon is ripe, he defeasibly infers a value for its Sound attribute: mued. Thus,
the cognitive signicance of dependency and expectancy relations consists in the
fact that given part of a sentence, a language user will defeasibly infer as much
additional information about the situation described by the sentence as possible.
Consider the following example. Suppose there is an input state representing
mostly ducks (say, because the topic of a conversation are ducks). Then an event of
4 Or, as sets of sets of assignments. See section 3 for details.
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swimming is more expected than events of jumping or walking. By contrast, if
the topic is about deers, swimming is less expected than jumping.5
3 Outline of the formalization
3.1 Structures for events, objects and their properties
We start by xing models for objects and events that capture sortal information
which is used in dening the lexical meanings of common nouns and verbs.
Denition 1 (Object structure) Let CN be a set of object sort symbols like ‘or-
ange’. An object structure O is a quadruple 〈O, {Pcn}cn∈CN ,vo,unionsqo〉 s.t. (i) O is
a non-empty set of objects like trees and dogs; (ii) each Pcn is a subset of O; (iii)
vo is the material part-of relation onO, which is required to be a partial order and (iv)
unionsqo is the join operation on O, which is required to be a join-semilattice.
Denition 2 (Event structure) Let VERB be a set of event sort symbols like e.g.
‘squeeze’. An event structure E is a quadruple 〈E, {Pv}v∈VERB,ve,unionsqe〉 s.t. (i) E is
a non-empty set of actions and/or events like runnings or readings; (ii) each Pv is
a subset of E; (iii) ve is the material part-of relation on E, which is required to
be a partial order and (iv) unionsqe is the join operation on E, which is required to be
a join-semilattice.
Elements of E and O will be called entities. At the level of O and E , entities are
taken as elements of the underlying domain of some xed global modelM, which
can have parts. Examples are the leg of a table or the tail of a dog for the domain O
of persistent objects and a subevent of eating half an apple for the eating of the
whole apple in the domain E. Such relations are represented by a part-of relations
vo and ve, respectively. In addition, they can be ‘summed’ to form plural entities.
For example, if o, say Fred, and o′, say Mary, are elements of the object domain
O, then o unionsq o′ is also an element of O. This is modeled by the join operations
unionsqo and unionsqe, respectively.
What is missing at this level is the view of an entitiy as a ‘bundle’ of properties,
corresponding to a decompositional analysis at the linguistic and/or conceptual
level. Such a view makes it possible to impose constraints on (the values of)
properties of entities denoted by common nouns and events. Properties of objects
5 See van Elk et al. (2010) for empirical evidence based on an EEG study and references cited therein.
71
Ralf Naumann
like ‘Ripeness’, ‘Sound’ or ‘Age’ are represented by partially or linearly ordered sets,
called scale structures.
Denition 3 (Scale structure) A scale structure D is a pair 〈∆,≤〉 s.t. ∆ is a
non-empty set of degrees, the set of admissible values for the scale, and ≤ is an
ordering on ∆, usually either a partial or a linear order. Scales are required to have a
least element. Intuitively, the least element means that no information about the
value is known or provided.
Let PROP be a set of property symbols like ‘sort’ or ‘ripeness’ and let {Dp}
⊕
p∈PROP
be a family of scale structures indexed by elements from PROP. Elements of O
are assigned a subset of {Dp}p∈PROP by a (subset of a) family of partial functions
{γp}p∈PROP, which assign to an o ∈ O the scale structure Dp, if dened. The
following condition is imposed on this assignment. If o, o′ ∈ Pcn, then γp(o) is
dened i γp(o′) is dened and one has γp(o) = γp(o′), i.e. objects belonging
to the same sort are assigned the same scale structures. If γp(o) is dened for
an object of sort cn, the property p is said to be admissible for objects of sort cn.
While processing a common noun, context information and world knowledge
provide a language user with the current values of some of the properties assigned
to the object denoted by the common noun. This decomposition can be represented
as a (nite) conjunction of the form (8).6
(8) φσ ∧ φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn (= φ)
In (8), φσ expresses sortal information (lexical meaning), i.e. information about
the property ‘Sort’ and the φi non-sortal information (context information and
world knowledge), e.g. information about properties like ‘Ripeness’. Since in
general a language user doesn’t know the values of all properties of the object,
he is epistemically uncertain about the exact ‘status’ of the object. For example,
suppose that w.r.t. a particular melon the values of the properties ‘Form’ and
‘Origin’ are known to be ‘oblong’ and ‘spain’ by a language user and that there are
exactly two other properties ‘Sound‘ and ‘Ripeness’, whose possible values are
‘dull’ or ‘mued’ and ‘not ripe’ or ‘ripe’, respectively. The set of possibilities can
be represented by the following set of assignments. The ‘real’ melon could be
any of the four melons, each corresponding to a variable assignment.
6 Alternatively, the conjunction φ can be taken as a set of formulas, i.e. as a knowledge base in theories
of belief revision.
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object sort form origin sound ripeness
m1 melon oblong spain dull ripe
m2 melon oblong spain dull not ripe
m3 melon oblong spain mued ripe
m4 melon oblong spain mued not ripe
Table 2: A set of possibilities for an object denoted by the common noun ‘melon’
3.2 Dependence logic
One way of looking at Table 2 is as a table in a database. In Dependence Logic
(Väänänen 2007), such tables are an instance of a team. A team is a set of agents,
with an agent being dened as a function from nite sets (or tuples) of variables,
called the domain of the agent, into an arbitrary set, called the codomain of the
agent. In the present context, agents are objects, i.e. elements of the domain O,
viewed as bundles of properties.
Denition 4 (Team Dependence Logic) Let 〈x1, . . . xn〉 be a nite tuple of prop-
erty variables such that no two variables are of the same property sort (i.e. each variable
has associated with it a sort p ∈ PROP). LetM be the union of the domains ∆ from
{Dp}p∈PROP. An agent is any function from 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 toM . A team S is a set
of agents. A team S is admissible for objects of sort cn if dom(S) = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉
and for xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n the sort of x1 v(i) is admissible for objects of sort cn.
Each row in Table 2 is an assignment, or, when viewed from the point of view
of an application, a possible description of an object (an agent). Properties of
objects (agents) are represented by attributes which are variables in the formal
representation. Thus, teams are directly related to the view of an object as a ‘bundle’
of properties.
An operation on teams is the supplement operation, which adds a new attribute
to the objects in a team, or alternatively changes the value of an existing attribute.
Denition 5 (Supplement of a team; Väänänen 2007) If M is a set, S is a
team with M as its codomain and F : S → M , S(F/xn) is the supplement
team {s(F (s)/xn) : s ∈ S}, where s(a/xn) is the assignment which agrees
with s everywhere except that it maps xn to a: dom(s/xn) = dom(s) ∪ {xn},
s(a/xn)(xi) = s(xi) when xi ∈ dom(s) \ {xn} and s(a/xn)(xn) = a.
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The supplement operation is used to model the combination of the lexical mean-
ing of a common noun with context information and world knowledge about
the referent of this noun in a given context. Let xn, . . . , xm, n < m, be the
attributes about which the context and world knowledge provide information.
If S is the team corresponding to the lexical meaning of a common noun, then
S(F/xn)(F/xn+1) . . . (F/xm) is the team resulting from adding the information
aboute the attributes xn, . . . , xm.
In Dependence Logic, formulas are interpreted with respect to sets of assign-
ments (teams) and not w.r.t. to single assignments as in rst-order logic. In Dynamic
Dependence Logic, formulas are interpreted as relations between sets of assign-
ments (Galliani 2014). This shift makes it possible to dene dependency relations
between attributes. For example, functional dependency between a sequence ~x
of variables and a variable y is expressed by the atomic formula =(~x, y), with
the intuitive meaning ‘the ~x totally determine y’. The satisfaction clause for this
dependence atom is (9a). The constancy atom =(x) requires the value of the
attribute x to be constant in a team, (9b). This formula is used to express that
a language user knows the value of an attribute.7
(9) a. M |=S =(~x, y) i ∀s, s′ ∈ S(s(~x) = s′(~x)→ s(y) = s′(y))
b. M |=S =(y) i ∀s, s′ ∈ S(s(y) = s′(y))
c. M |=X ∃xφ i there is a function F : X → ∃M such that M |=X[F/x] φ,
where ∃M is the local existential quantier dened by {A ⊆ M |A 6= ∅}
and S[F/x] is the team {s[a/x] | s ∈ S, a ∈ F (s)}.
The interpretation of the existential quantier is based on the supplement operation,
i.e. it either adds a new attribute to all agents in the current team, or alternatively
it changes the value of an existing attribute. Thus, the existential quantier is
inherently dynamic in the sense that it changes the current team w.r.t. which
it is interpreted (see Galliani 2014, for details on a dynamic interpretation of
Dependence Logic).
Using the dependence formula =(~x, y), it is possible to express dependencies
between properties like ‘Age’ and ‘Price’ for stamps and ‘Ripeness’ and ‘Sound’ for
melons.
7 For formulas that do not contain a dependence atom, one has:M |=S φ i for all s ∈ S :M |=s φ,
where |=s is the usual Tarskian satisfaction relation.
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(10) a. =(age, price)
b. =(ripeness, sound)
For example, (10b) says that the value of the attribute Sound is functionally de-
pendent on that of the attribute Ripeness. Both examples in (10) are not quite
correct because they do not take into consideration that for example (10a) holds for
stamps but not for other artefacts or human beings. Second, the value of the price
depends in general not only on its age but also on other factors like availability or
demand. These shortcomings can be remedied as follows.
(11) a. xsort = stamp→ =(age, price)
b. xsort = stamp→ =(age, availability, demand, . . . , price)
A team represents the set of possibilities of a language user in the following sense:
g ∈ S if and only if the language user believes g to be a possible (and complete)
description of the object. As noted in Galliani & Väänänen (2014), moving from
assignments to teams (or sets of assignments), makes it possible to assign to
each formula φ and model M the family of teams S = {S |M |=S φ}. As a
consequence, formulas can be interpreted as conditions over belief sets. Knowledge
of the value of a property in the sense that this property is assigned the same
value in all information states can be expressed by a constancy atom =(x). In Table
2 above, this holds for the attributes ‘sort’, ‘form’ and ‘origin’.
Denition 6 (Information state w.r.t. to an object) Given a decompositional
formula φ representing the beliefs of a language user about an object o ∈ O, his
epistemic uncertainty (or his set of possibilities) w.r.t. to o is given by the family
of teams S of teams satisfying φ, i.e. S = {S |M |=S φ}.
Note that information states are dened w.r.t. the domainO of objects. The domain
E of events plays no role. Rather, this domain functions as a state transformer:
elements of this domain trigger changes in information states.
3.3 Ranking functions
So far, the information state about an object of a language user is at in the sense
that all teams in this information state are taken as equally plausible. However,
a language user also has expectancies about (i) the values of properties about which
he so far doesn’t have any information and (ii) sorts of events in which an object of
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the given sort is most plausibly involved. These expectations lead to a ranking
of the teams in his information state. Such expectancies are dened in terms of
κ-rankings, which are based on the notion of surprise.
Denition 7 (κ-ranking function; Goldszmidt & Pearl 1992, Spohn 1988)
A ranking is a function κ : Ω → N∗ with Ω a non-empty set such that κ(ω) = 0
for at least one ω ∈ Ω and N∗ = N ∪ {∞}.
In the present context, Ω is either a set of teams (or possible worlds with each
world representing a team in Ω) or the domain E. The numbers can be thought of
as denoting degrees of surprise (Halpern 2005, p.43). For example, κ(w) is the
degree of surprise a language user attributes to team w to be the ‘correct’ team
representing the interpretation of a sentence or a part of it. The higher the number,
the greater the degree of surprise. For example, ‘0’ means ‘completely unsurprising’
whereas greater numbers express increasingly higher degrees of surprise. The
value ∞ means ‘impossible’ or ‘so surprising as to be impossible’. In terms of
plausibility or expectancy, the value 0 means ‘most plausible’ or ‘most expected’.
Though degrees of surprise are assigned to elements of Ω, they can also be dened
to formulas φ. The rank or degree of surprise of φ is the least rank of the set of
worlds in which φ is true, (12).
(12) κ(φ) = minw{κ(w) |M |=w φ}
One has κ(φ) < κ(ψ) if φ is less surprising than ψ. For example, given an
information state about a melon in which it is known that this melon is ripe it
is less surprising to nd that its taste is sweet than to nd that the taste is not sweet
but sour. One therefore has κ(sweet) < κ(sour).
κ-rankings are not only used for ranking information states and formulas but
also to dene defeasible conditionals that allow to defeasibly infer information ψ
from information φ. These conditionals have the form φ δ→ ψ and mean ‘Typically,
if φ then expect ψ with strength δ’ (Goldszmidt & Pearl 1992). If φ δ→ ψ holds
w.r.t. a ranking κ, ψ must be true in all most expected (or least surprising) worlds
in which φ is true. This condition imposed on→ can be expressed in terms of
conditional ranks, which have the form ψ|φ. Intuitively, ψ|φ expresses the degree of
surprise of nding ψ given that φ is known to be true. The denition of ψ|φ is
given in (13).
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(13) κ(ψ|φ) = κ(ψ ∧ φ)− κ(φ)
The inequality κ(¬ψ|φ) > δ means that given φ it would be surprising by at least
δ+ 1 ranks to nd ¬ψ and is equivalent to κ(ψ∧φ) + δ < κ(¬ψ∧φ) (Goldszmidt
& Pearl 1992). Now φ δ→ ψ is dened by (14).
(14) φ δ→ ψ i κ(ψ ∧ φ) + δ < κ(¬ψ ∧ φ).
A ranking function κ is said to be admissible with respect to a set ∆ of defeasible
conditionals if (15) holds.
(15) κ(φi ∧ ψi) + δi < κ(φi ∧ ¬ψi) for all φ δ→ ψ ∈ ∆.
Each type of (defeasible) inference discussed in the introduction is analyzed in
terms of a mapping whose range is a ranking function of a particular kind. These
mappings dier w.r.t. (i) the sort of the domain, which reects what is known
by the language user, and (ii) the domain of the ranking function, which reects the
type or sort of knowledge that is defeasibly inferred from this knowledge. The
following cases have to be distinguished.
1. given: information about the sort of an object;
inferred: information about the action (event) in which this object is involved.
Example: given: ‘duck’; inferred: ‘swim’.
2. given: information about the sort of an action (event);
inferred: information about the sort of participants (modulo a thematic role)
Example: given: ‘swim’; inferred: ‘duck’, ‘dolphin’ or ‘sh’.
3. given: information about the value of an attribute a;
inferred: information about the value of a dierent attribute a′.
Example ‘The melon is ripe’: given: ‘Ripeness:ripe’; inferred: ‘Sound:mued’.
4. given: the sort of an ection (event);
inferred: the values of attributes of objects involved in the event that hold
in the consequent state of the event.
A rst example is ‘The melon ripened’. There are at least two inferences that
can be drawn about the consequent state of the ripening: (i) it is ripe, i.e.
the value of the Ripeness attribute is ‘ripe’ and (ii) the value of the Sound
attribute is ‘mued’. Inference (i) is non-defeasible because ‘ripen’ is a degree
achievement that requires the maximum value on the underlying scale to
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hold in the end state of the event. By contrast, inference (ii) is defeasible.
A second, more complex, example is given by PBV’s: ‘The melon sounds ripe’.
This sentence is based on experiencing a mued sound of the melon (‘The
melon sounds mued’). Next, a most plausible sort of event is looked for such
that Sound:mued holds in its consequent state. In this case an event of
ripening is the most expected candidate. Since in the consequent state of
such an event Ripeness:ripe holds, ‘The melon sounds ripe’ follows.
5. given: a change in the value of an attribute a;
inferred: a change in another attribute a′.
An example is given by ‘The older a stamp, the more expensive it is’.
3.4 Rankings on information states
In a rst step, the set of teamsW satisfying (part of) a decompositional formula φ is
ranked.
Denition 8 (Ranking on information states) A ranking on an information
state corresponding to a decompositional formula φ = φ1 . . . φn is a ranking function
κ : W → N∗ s.t. κ−1(0) ⊆ [[φi]] iM |=w =(φi) for all w ∈W .
The condition κ−1(0) ⊆ [[φi]] iM |=w =(φ) expresses the requirement that a
language user knows the value of a property if it is constant in all teams belonging to
the information state.8 Note that it is not required that the whole decompositional
formula φ be known. For example, if a language user only knows that the object is
of sort Pcn, only φσ satises the condition κ−1(0) ⊆ [[φσ]].
The ranking function κ can naturally be interpreted as characterizing the de-
gree to which a language user is willing (i) to predict possible continuations of
a sentences with respect to properties of objects and (ii) to accept alternative
descriptions which are not in accordance with his current information about the
object. For example, in the case of a melon or an orange, the most plausible or least
surprising values for the attribute ‘Taste’ is ‘fruity’, whereas ‘salty’ will most likely
get the value∞ because it is deemed to be impossible.
8 It is assumed that an attribute (or a property) has exactly one value, i.e. attributes are functional
relations.
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3.5 Rankings of information states on events
The rst mapping to be dened captures case (1) Since this case concerns the
expectancy of particular sorts of events given the sort of an object, it has to be a
mapping from the domain W of teams in an information state to a ranking function
κ with domain E.
Denition 9 (Event ordering; Boutilier 1998) An event ordering is a mapping
µ : W → (E → N∗) that maps each w ∈ W to a κ-ranking E → N∗ on the
domain of events E. Instead of µ(w), we will write κw . It is required that κw(e) = 0
for some event e ∈ E, i.e. there is at least one most plausible event to occur in a world
w. If κw(e) =∞, this means that an occurrence of e atw is taken to be impossible. In
addition we require κw(e) = κw(e′) for two events e, e′ belonging to the same sort
Pv , i.e. events of the same sort are assigned identical plausibility for a given w.
Given µ, each world w has associated with it an event ordering µ(w) that deter-
mines the plausibility of event occurrences at that world.9 For example, if W is a
family of teams of sort ‘duck’, events of sort ‘swim’ will be assigned the value
0. By contrast, if the sort is ‘deer’, events of sort ‘jump’ are most plausible and
hence get value 0. For human beings, the set of most plausible events is in general
rather large due to the fact that they can be correlated to a large number of dierent
sorts of events (see van Elk et al. 2010, for details).
Since W represents information about objects, the mapping µ establishes a
relation between the domain O and the domain E. The cognitive signicance
of this mapping is the following. Given an information state w, a language user
uses κw to defeasibly infer the most plausible events that are likely to occur with an
information state of this sort and, in an additional step, expects particular verbs (or
verbs stems) to occur farther down the sentence which denote events of those sorts.
3.6 Rankings of information states w.r.t. events
The mapping µ only captures the expectancy of the occurrence of an event given
objects of a particular sort. Next we dene an analogous mapping that determines
the expectancy of a particular sort of object, given information about an event
of some sort. It maps elements of the domainE to ranking functions with a domain
of teams. This corresponds to case (2).
9 Intuitively, κw(e) captures the plausibility of the occurrence of event e at w.
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Denition 10 (Information state ranking for events) An information state
ranking for events is a mapping µ∗ : E → (W → N∗) that is dened by µ∗(e)(w) =
µ(w)(e).
Intuitively, µ∗ captures the fact of what types of information states are ‘preferred’
by events of a given sort. The cognitive signicance of this mapping is similar to
that of µ. If a verb is encountered denoting events of type σ, a language users
uses this mapping to predict the most plausible sorts of objects to ll in a role in the
event. In contrast to the mapping µ, there is not a single mapping but rather a
family of such mappings because this type of mapping must be dened relative to a
particular thematic role like actor or patient.
3.7 Event outcome ranking
In a nal step, we dene the relation between an event and its possible outcomes.
This mapping maps an event and a team (the input state) to a ranking function on
teams such that an element of this domain functions as the consequent state which
results when the event occurs in the input state.
Denition 11 (Event outcome ranking) An event outcome ranking is a mapping
τ : E → (W → (W → N∗)) that assigns to an event e ∈ E and an (input)
information state w a ranking function on the set of information states. It is required
that ∀e, e′ ∈ Pv : τ(e)(w) = τ(e′)(w) hold, i.e. events of the same sort have the
same outcome ranking functions relative to a given world w. Since τ(e)(w) is a
ranking function, one must have τ(e)(w)(w′) = 0 for at least one event w′ so that
one outcome of e is most plausible.
Intuitively, τ(e)(w)(w′) describes the plausibility that the worldw′ results when
event e occurs in w (Boutilier 1998:292). For example, an event denoted by ‘ripen’
results in a state in which the object that undergoes the change, say a melon, is
ripe.10 The cognitive signicance of τ is the following. If a language user knows the
sort of the event, say after having processed the predicate, he can defeasibly infer
possible outcomes. Thus the set of possible outcomes (teams) is not a at set but a
ranked set of alternatives. LetSe,w = {v | τ(e)(w)(v) 6=∞} be the set of outcomes
that possibly result for a given e and w. The mapping τ then induces a ranking
κ on this information state as follows: κ(v) < κ(v′) i τ(e)(w)(v) < τ(e)(w)(v′).
10 ‘The melon ripened’ implies that the melon was ripe at the end of the event since ‘ripen’ is a so-called
degree achievement.
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This mapping is used for case (iv). For example, if the sentence "The melon
ripened" is processed, a language user not only knows that an event of sort ‘ripen’
occurred but in addition, by using τ , he infers that (i) the melon is ripe and (ii) that
it sounds mued. Again, (i) is a non-defeasible inference whereas (ii) is defeasible.
The mapping τ is extended to sequences (or histories) of events in the following
way.
(16) w e
n
−→ v i there are u0, . . . , un s.t. w = u0 and v = un, e1 . . . en s.t.
en = e1unionsq. . .unionsqen and for each (ui, ui+1) with 0 ≤ i < n one has ui ei+1−→ ui+1.
For w e
n
−→ v, the rank is dened as the sum of the ranks of its component (atomic)
transitions.
(17) τ∗(e)(w)(v) =
∑
τ(ei+1)(ui)(ui+1)
This rank expresses the degree to which a language user thinks that this history
might occur (or has been occurred, using an abductive argument). It is used for
case (5). Each history represents a possible evolution of how an outcome φ can
be brought about by a sequence of events e = e1 . . . en = en. For example, if
the sort of the events ei is restricted to events of sort ‘ageing’, all histories have an
outcome in which the object undergoing the change is older than in the input
state. The output states can dier w.r.t. other properties, like ‘Price’ for example,
that can also be changed by an event of sort ‘ageing’.
4 Applying the formalism to the data from section 1
When processing a sentence, a language users knows that his current information
state will be changed to a new one. Using his world knowledge, he also knows that
this sentence either describes a change in the world or the persistence of a property
of an object. In the former case the event described can either be deterministic or
non-deterministic and the sentence can describe a relation between two properties
over time that are linked by a dependency relation.
The cognitive signicance of ranking functions and dependency relations is
grounded in the fact that they allow a language user to anticipate as much in-
formation as possible about the potential output information state that results from
processing the next upcoming sentence. Using the mappings κ, µ, µ∗ and τ , he
81
Ralf Naumann
can already calculate the plausibility of a transition w e−→ v as follows (Boutilier
1998:292).11
(18) κ(w e−→ v) = τ(e)(w)(v) + µ(w)(e) + κ(w).
According to (18), the plausibility of a transitionw e−→ v depends on the plausibility
of w, the degree to which an event e is expected to occur in w and the degree
to which event e can bring about an outcome v given input w.12 Given a condition
φ that has to hold in the output state v, the set of possible φ-transitions is dened
by (19) (Boutilier 1998:293).
(19) Tr(φ) = {w e−→ v | v |= φ ∧ κ(w e−→ v) 6=∞}.
The most plausible transitions resulting in an outcome state satisfying φ are (20).
(20) mpt(φ) = {v |w e−→ v ∈ min(Tr(φ))}.
In our application to natural language, the interpretation of a sentence need
not involve all three mappings. Consider ‘The melon ripened’ and ‘The duck swam’.
After processing the subject a language user is given a ranked set of teams, i.e.
an information state, of a particular sort: ‘melon’ and ‘duck’, respectively. He noe
uses the mappings τ andµ∗ to predict a most expected action and/or event together
with most expected results in which a melon or a duck are involved. Thus, in this
particular case he will calculate κw(w
e−→ v) = τ(e)(w)(v) +µ(w)(e) for a given
w or, equivalently, κ(w e−→ v) = τ(e)(w)(v) + µ(w)(e) + κ(w) with κ(w) = 0.
For ‘melon’, an event of ripening has a particular non-defeasible outcome: the
melon is ripe. Given this most expected event, there is in addition a most expected
(least surprising) outcome: it will sound mued. As a consequence, the most
expected (least surprising) elements of the setS(w) = {(e, v) |w e−→ v} will be
events of sort ripening with a consequent state v in which the melon is both ripe
and sounds mued. By contrast, for ‘duck’ and ‘swim’, the corresponding set
is larger because a swimming event usually has no single, most expected outcome.
For example, there can be a change of location or a loss of energy as well as a
combination of such results. However, none of those changes need be salient in a
11 As noted by Boutilier (1998:292), this formula is the qualitative analogue of the probabilistic equation
Pr(w
e−→ v) = Pr(v|w, e) · Pr(e|w) · Pr(w).
12 For expectations that involve the passing of time like for instance in ‘The older a stamp, the more
expensive it is’, the mapping τ∗ instead of the mapping τ is used.
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given context. One way of modelling this lack of salience of particular results
is to assume that nothing changes with respect to properties in the input state w by
setting v = w. Below we will see how this idea can be made precise by using
defeasible conditionals.
A drawback of using ranking functions directly is that they involve teams.
However, in many cases an expectation only involves two particular properties
and not all properties denoted by a complete decompositional formula. For this
reason, defeasible inferences based on expectations are better directly expressed in
terms of those properties. One way of doing this which is still based on ranking
functions, is to formulate defeasible inferences in terms of defeasble conditionals.
We follow Goldszmidt & Pearl (1992), who dene a consequence relation on a
set ∆ of defeasible conditionals and a distinguished κ-ranking κ+. This ranking is
dened as a ranking function that is minimal in the sense that any other admissible
ranking function must be assigned a higher ranking to at least one world and
a lower ranking to none.13 As a consequence, κ+ assigns to each world the lowest
possible rank permitted by the admissible constraint. The exact denition is given
below. The parameter δ stands for the strength with which the consequent follows
from the antecedent. This takes care of the fact that the inference is defeasible
and, at least in general, not strict. The greater δ, the greater the strength with
which σ follows from φ. In the limiting case if δ = ∞, the defeasible inference
is strict. In the sequel, when giving examples of defeasible conditionals, the exact
value of δ will be left open since this value has to be determined empirically.
Denition 12 (Plausible inference; Goldszmidt & Pearl 1992) σ is a plausi-
ble conclusion of φ relative to a set ∆ of defeasible conditionals, written φ |δ∼ σ, i
κ+(φ ∧ σ) + δ < κ+(φ ∧ ¬σ).
The antecedent contains information about the input information state which
expresses information that is known to the language user, i.e. it is required that one
has M |=S =(φ) for each team S in the input information state. The dierence
between the two types of information consists in their strength. Whereas the
antecedent has to be known, for the information in the consequent this need not
be the case.14 Thus, the consequent contains information that can defeasibly be
added to this input information state, resulting in a new (output) information
state. This information state not only consists of the information that results
13 Goldszmidt & Pearl (1992) show that any consistent set ∆ has a minimal ranking.
14 How this dierence is modelled in the output information state must be left to another occasion.
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when semantically processing the (surface) constituents of a sentence but also
by adding the information in the consequent of defeasible conditionals whose
antecedent matches information that is given by processing a particular constituent
or, more generally, by information that is given by the context. The addition of the
information in the consequent is modeled by using the supplement operation from
Dynamic Logic, expressed by the existential quantier. In the context of a dynamic
semantics defeasible conditionals are used to construct the output information
state. For example, if the consequent has the form φ1 ∧ . . . φn with φi ≡ xσ , For
‘The melon ripened’, one gets the defeasible conditional (21a), and for ‘The duck
swam’ the defeasible conditional (21b).
(21) a. xobject = melon |δ∼xevent = ripen ∧ xripeness = ripe ∧ xsound = mued
b. xobject = duck |δ∼xevent = swim
The dierence between an event of ripening, which brings about particular results
and which therefore has a consequent state, and an event of swimming is captured
by the fact that for the former but not for the latter there are defeasible conditionals
specifying inferences about what holds in the consequent state.
Simple sentences and the N400.
For simple sentences like ‘John squeezed an orange’, only the mappings µ and
µ∗ are important. Outcomes play no role because only the expectancy relations
between sorts are involved. In (22), two examples of plausible inferences are given
(22) a. xsort = squeeze |δ∼xtheme = orange.
b. xsort = orange |δ∼xevent = squeeze ∨ xevent = buy.
Example (22b) is used to augment the current state with the information that the
eventuality is of sort ‘squeeze’ or of sort ‘buy’. If δ > 0 holds, this means that
a language user is more reluctant to draw the plausible inference. However, in the
present context it is assumed that a language user only uses plausible inferences
where δ = 0. In the consequent, the existential quantier is used, in order to
capture the dynamic character of this defeasible inference since a new attribute,
here xevent has to be introduced.
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The the . . . the-construction and the inferential user of PBVs.
In contrast to simple sentences like ‘John squeezed an orange’, which can be
analyzed in terms of only using κ, µ and µ∗, both the the . . . the-construction
and the inferential use of PBVs involve in addition the outcome mapping τ . This is
a direct consequence of the fact that they involve dependencies of (the values
of) properties over time.
The the . . . the-construction.
Consider again example (6a), repeated here as (23).
(23) The older a stamp, the more expensive it is.
The price of a stamp is in general not only dependent on its age but also on other
factors such as availibility and demand. In Dependence Logic, this dependency can
be expressed by (24), where ~x is a sequence of variables (attributes) containing ‘age’.
(24) =(~x, price)
Such a functional dependency is a necessary condition for the truth of a the . . . the-
construction. In addition, a stamp can get older without becoming more expensive
at the same time. Thus, one only has ‘Typically (normally), a stamp gets more
expensive if it gets older’. Therefore, an event of sort ‘ageing’ (or ‘getting older’) for
a stamp can have at least two dierent outcomes. In one output only the age of the
stamp has increased and in a second output both its age and its price have increased
(relative to the input state). As a consequence, events of ageing for stamps are
non-deterministic. Since the the . . . the-construction involves the comparative
construction the . . . the, it is necessary to not only consider single transitions but
sequences of such transitions dened in terms of the mapping τ∗.
The output states ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, of the (atomic) transitions dier in the value
assigned to the outcome mapping τ .15 Assuming τ(e)(w)(v) = 0, just in case
v satises both the condition that the value of ‘Age’ has increased and that the
value of ‘Price’ has increased, the most plausible histories involving a sequence of
ageing events for a stamp are those in which both the stamp not only gets older but
also gets more expensive.16
15 They do not dier w.r.t. κ and µ because an event of ageing leaves these rankings unchanged.
16 An analogous argument for other sorts of objects need not go through as in this case τ(e)(w)(v)
need not be 0.
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In dening a defeasible conditional based on τ∗, one abstracts from the temporal
development. Rather, one only uses the information that the value of the given
attribute, say Age, in the input information state has increased (decreased) and
that there is a corresponding change in the dependent attribute, say Price. Thus,
the general form of a defeasible conditional based on τ∗ has the form (25a). For
(23), one gets (25b). Using this defeasible conditional, one infers that the value
of the Price attribute has increased too.
(25) a. xesort = σe ∧ xosort = σo ∧ xoattr = β ∧ xoattr′ = α |
δ∼xoattr 6= β ∧ xoattr′ 6= α.
b. xesort = ageing∧xosort = stamp∧xoage = α∧xoprice = β|δ∼xoage > α∧xoprice > β.
Inferential use of PBVs.
On its inferential use, the interpretation of a PBV involves a change. We will argue
that the interpretation process is similar to an abductive argument (see Boutilier
1998) involving three steps. Consider the example ‘The melon sounds ripe’. First,
there is an observation (perception): the melon emits a particular sound that is
classified as ‘muffled’. Second, an explanation for this particular sound value is
given by postulating some (most) plausible event or events that could have brought
about the observed change in the property expressed by the verb (‘sound’ in this
case). Besides a ripening event, the sound of the melon could have been manipulated
mechanically. But the former event is assumed to be more plausible, say due to
experience and general world knowledge. Finally, the outcomes of this event are
calculated. In this case one gets that the melon is ripe. The defeasible element is
the postulation of a (most) plausible event. In the case of PBVs, this is an event
related to the property expressed by the predicative complement, e.g. a ripening
in the case of ‘The melon sounds ripe’ where the predicative complement is ‘ripe’.
Similar to the the . . . the-construction, there are two constraints that must be
satised. First, there must be a functional dependency between the two properties.
For example, the value of the ‘Sound’ property must be determined by the value of
the ‘Ripeness’ property. Second, this condition need only hold in the normal or
typical case.17 Consider (26).
(26) *The melon sounds oval.
17 Gamerschlag & Petersen (2012) and Petersen & Gamerschlag (2014) formulate related constraints in
their type-based frame analysis of PBVs.
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In this case there is no functional dependency between the value of the property
‘Sound’ and the property ‘Form’. In a team of sort ‘melon’, the value of the ‘Form’
property can arbitrarily vary while the ‘Sound’ property remains constant, say
‘mued’. For ‘The melon sounds mued’, the information in the input information
state is (27a). The rst defeasible inference is based on the mapping µ, (27b). The
second step involves the non-defeasible inference that an event denoted by the
verb ‘ripe’ brings about a state in which the object undergoing the ripening is
ripe at the end of the event (27c). When taken together, one gets (27d).
(27) a. xosound = mued ∧ xosort = melon.
b. xosound = mued ∧ xosort = melon |δ∼xesort = ripen.
c. xesort = ripen ∧ xosort = melon ` xoripeness = ripe.
d. xosound = mued ∧ xosort = melon ∧ xesort = ripen |δ∼xoripeness = ripe.
5 Summary
In this paper we developed an extension of a dynamic semantic theory for natural
language which makes it possible to express both dependency relations between
properties of objects and expectancies between nominal and verbal concepts. The
theory is based on a decompositional analysis of common nouns in which they are
interpreted as ‘bundles’ of properties, similar to the way objects are represented in
database theories. The ranking functions dening those expectancies are used
to draw defeasible inferences from information that is provided by the lexical
meaning of words in a sentence that have already been processed.
Needless to say, the theory has to be worked out in greater formal detail: (i) The
relation between Dependence Logic and κ-rankings must be further explored. E.g.,
is it possible to dene ranking functions directly in Dependence Logic?; (ii) The
dynamic component must be made more explicit. In particular, how are information
states for various objects modeled and how is it possible to explicitly talk about
changes?; (iii) How are the rankings empirically determined? Possible approaches
are strategies from n-gram models and techniques used in neuroscience based
on the concept of cloze probability; and (iv) Defeasible inferences are simply added
to the output information state. As a consequence, there is no distinction between
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ (defeasible) information.
87
Ralf Naumann
References
Baggio, Giosuè & Peter Hagoort. 2011. The balance between memory and uni-
cation in semantics: A dynamic account of the N400. Language and Cognitive
Processes 26(9). 1338–1367.
Boutilier, Craig. 1998. A unied model of qualitative belief change: A dynamical
systems perspective. Articial Intelligence 98(1-2). 281–316.
van Elk, Michiel, Hein T. van Schie, Rolf A. Zwaan & Harold Bekkering. 2010.
The functional role of motor activation in language processing: Motor cortical
oscillations support lexical-semantic retrieval. NeuroImage 50(2). 665–677.
Federmeier, Kara D. & Marta Kutas. 1999. A rose by any other name: Long-term
memory structure and sentence processing. Journal of Memory and Language
41(4). 469–495.
Galliani, Pietro. 2014. Transition semantics: the dynamics of dependence logic.
Synthese 191(6). 1249–1276.
Galliani, Pietro & Jouko A. Väänänen. 2014. On dependence logic. In A. Baltag &
S. Smets (eds.). Johan van Benthem on logic and information dynamics. 101–119.
Springer.
Gamerschlag, Thomas & Wiebke Petersen. 2012. An analysis of the evidential
use of German perception verbs. In C. Hart (ed.). Selected papers from the 3rd UK
Cognitive Linguistics Conference. Vol. 1. 1–18.
Gärdenfors, Peter. 1988. Knowledge in ux. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Goldszmidt, Moisés & Judea Pearl. 1992. Rank-based systems: A simple approach to
belief revision, belief update, and reasoning about evidence and actions. In
B. Nebel, C. Rich & W. R. Swartout (eds.). Proceedings of the 3rd International
Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR’92).
661–672. Morgan Kaufmann.
Hagoort, Peter & Colin M. Brown. 1994. Brain responses to lexical ambiguity
resolution and parsing. In L. Frazier C. Clifton Jr & K. Rayner (eds.). Perspectives
on sentence processing. 45–81. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Halpern, Joseph Y. 2005. Reasoning about uncertainty. MIT Press.
Kutas, Marta & Kara D. Federmeier. 2011. Thirty years and counting: Finding
meaning in the N400 component of the event-related brain potential (ERP).
Annual Review of Psychology 62(1). 621–647.
88
Dependencies, semantic constraints and conceptual closeness in a dynamic frame theory
Löbner, Sebastian. 2014. Evidence for frames from human language. In T. Gamer-
schlag, D. Gerland, R. Osswald & W. Petersen (eds.). Frames and Concept Types.
Vol. 94. Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy. 23–67. Springer.
Naumann, Ralf. 2013. An outline of a dynamic theory of frames. In V. Marra
G. Bezhanishvili, S. Löbner & F. Richter (eds.). Proceedings of the 9th International
Tbilisi Symposium on Language, Logic and Computation. Vol. 7758 LNCS. 115–
137. Springer.
Petersen, Wiebke & Thomas Gamerschlag. 2014. Why chocolate eggs can taste
old but not oval: A frame-theoretic analysis of inferential evidentials. In
T. Gamerschlag, D. Gerland, R. Osswald & W. Petersen (eds.). Frames and
Concept Types. Vol. 94. Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy. 199–218. Springer.
Spohn, Wolfgang. 1988. Ordinal conditional functions: A dynamic theory of
epistemic states. In W.L. Harper & B. Skyrms (eds.). Causation in decision, belief
change, and statistics. Vol. II. 105–134. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Väänänen, Jouko A. 2007. Dependence logic - a new approach to independence
friendly logic. Vol. 70. London Mathematical Society Student Texts. Cambridge
University Press.
Author
Ralf Naumann
University of Düsseldorf
nauman@phil.uni-duesseldorf.de
89
